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Abstract: For most of the history of prejudice research, negativity has been treated as its emotional and 
cognitive signature, a conception that continues to dominate work on the topic.  By this definition, prejudice 
occurs when we dislike or derogate members of other groups. Recent research, however, has highlighted the 
need for a more nuanced and ‘inclusive’ (Eagly 2004) perspective on the role of intergroup emotions and 
beliefs in sustaining discrimination. On the one hand, several independent lines of research have shown that 
unequal intergroup relations are often marked by attitudinal complexity, with positive responses such as 
affection and admiration mingling with negative responses such as contempt and resentment.  Simple 
antipathy is the exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, there is mounting evidence that nurturing 
bonds of affection between the advantaged and the disadvantaged sometimes entrenches rather than disrupts 
wider patterns of discrimination. Notably, prejudice reduction interventions may have ironic effects on the 
political attitudes of the historically disadvantaged, decreasing their perceptions of injustice and willingness 
to engage in collective action to transform social inequalities. These developments raise a number of 
important questions. Has the time come to challenge the assumption that negative evaluations are inevitably 
the cognitive and affective hallmarks of discrimination?  Is the orthodox concept of prejudice in danger of 
side-tracking, if not obstructing, progress towards social justice in a fuller sense?  What are the prospects for 
reconciling a prejudice reduction model of change, designed to get people to like one another more, with a 
collective action model of change, designed to ignite struggles to achieve intergroup equality?  
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Over the course of the past century, the concept of prejudice has become increasingly central to scientific 
thinking about relations between groups, marking a profound moral and political as well as conceptual shift.  
During late 19th and early 20th centuries, many scholars favoured conceptual frameworks based around 
notions of group differences, hierarchy and biological inheritance (e.g. see Haller 1971; Goldberg 1993).  By 
rooting the causes of ethnic and racial hostility in the supposed characteristics of its targets, they upheld the 
traditional doctrine of the ‘well-deserved reputation’ (Zadwadzki 1948).  Between the 1920s and 1940s, 
however, an ‘abrupt reversal’ (Samelson, 1978) occurred in scientific thinking.  Rather than the inherited 
deficiencies of minorities, social disharmony was attributed increasingly to the bigotry of majority group 
members1.  In the years following the end the Second World War, the concept of prejudice became central to 
the explanation of a range of social problems, including problems of discrimination, inequality, ideological 
extremism, and genocide.  By the 1950s, prejudice research had “… spread like a flood both in social 
psychology and in adjacent social sciences” (Allport 1951, p.4).  The deluge continued in subsequent 
decades, and prejudice rapidly became a fundamental concept within research on intergroup relations.  
Yet what is prejudice? The modern roots of the term lie in the enlightenment liberalism of the 18th century, 
which distinguished opinions based on religious authority and tradition from opinions based on reason and 
scientific rationality (Billig 1988).  The legacy of this ideological heritance has been prominent in modern 
research, which often treats prejudice as a form of thinking that distorts social reality, leading us to judge “… 
a specific person on the basis of preconceived notions, without bothering to verify our beliefs or examine the 
merits of our judgements” (Saenger 1953, p.3).  
However, prejudice has seldom been treated purely as a matter of irrational beliefs.  It has also been widely 
characterized as a negative evaluation2 of others made on the basis of their group membership (see Table 1).  
The nature of the relationship between the cognitive and affective dimensions of this kind of evaluation has, 
of course, generated considerable debate. For some researchers, prejudice should be regarded an indissoluble 
combination of both; for others, emotional antipathy lies at the core of the problem, with concepts such as 
stereotyping being treated as empirically related but analytically distinct (e.g. see Duckitt 1992, p.11-13).  
Likewise, although most researchers have conceived prejudice as a generic negative response to members of 
another group, others have attempted to differentiate emotional sub-categories.  Kramer (1949) was an early 
advocate of this approach.  His work prefigured recent developments in research on intergroup emotions, 
evolutionary psychology and social neuroscience, which has increasingly focused on target-specific reactions 
such as fear, anger and disgust and on the evolutionary and neurological mechanisms that underpin such 
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reactions (e.g. see Cottrell & Neuberg 2005; Harris & Fiske 2006; Neuberg, Kendrick & Schaller 2011; 
Phelps et al. 2000). 
The underlying causes of our negative evaluations of others have also been subject to considerable debate 
and theoretical accounts have shifted over time.  Explanations of prejudice have been grounded variously in 
personality development, socialization, social cognition, evolutionary psychology and neuroscience, as well 
as sociological theories of normative and instrumental conflict (for overviews see Brown 1995; Dovidio 
2001; Dovidio, Glick & Rudman 2005; Duckitt 1992; Quillian 2006; Nelson 2009; Neuberg & Cottrell 2006; 
Wetherell & Potter 1992).  Moreover, whereas earlier theories focused on ‘hot’, direct, and explicit forms of 
prejudice (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950; Dollard et al. 1939; Sherif et al. 1961), modern theories often prioritize 
‘cool’, indirect, and implicit evaluations (e.g. Dovidio & Gaertner 2004; Kinder & Sears 1981; Pettigrew & 
Meertens 1995).  Notwithstanding this historical and conceptual complexity, at the heart of most prejudice 
research is a deceptively simple question: Why don’t we like one another?  
This question also underlies a closely related body of research on prejudice reduction, which encompasses 
work on interventions such as reeducation, perspective taking, cooperative learning, common identification, 
empathy arousal, and intergroup contact (e.g. Aronson & Patnoe 1997; Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & Landfield 
2009; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006; Stephan & Finlay 1999). Although evidence of their effectiveness has been 
challenged (Paluck & Green 2009), such interventions are typically portrayed as a shining example – perhaps 
the shining example -- of how social science research on intergroup relations can promote a better society 
(e.g. see Brewer 1997).  To be sure, in meeting the challenge of prejudice reduction, researchers have 
adopted varying theoretical perspectives, with varying implications for how processes of change are 
formulated.  Perspectives treating prejudice as the outcome of deep-seated personality dynamics, for 
example, have constructed the problem of change differently than perspectives treating it as the outcome of 
more tractable forces such as social norms (e.g. Long 1951).  Likewise, perspectives treating prejudice as a 
consciously held attitude have constructed change differently than perspectives treating it as an automatic 
and implicit process (e.g. Olson & Fazio 2006; Wheeler & Fiske 2005).  By and large, however, advocates of 
prejudice reduction have united around a central imperative, which has become an interdisciplinary rallying 
call: How can we get individuals to think more positive thoughts about, and hold more positive feelings 
towards, members of other groups?  In short, how can we get people to like each other? 
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Table 1 Some definitions of prejudice 
… feelings of intergroup hostility (Allport & Kramer 1946, p.9). 
… an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. (Allport 1954, p.10). 
… an unjustified negative attitude towards an individual based solely on that individual’s membership in a 
group. (Jones 1972, p.61). 
. . . a negative attitude towards members of a minority group (Levin & Levin 1982, p.66). 
… a negative attitude towards members of socially defined groups (Stephan 1983, p.417). 
…the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect or the 
display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group on account of their membership 
of that group. (Brown 1995, p.8). 
…an unjustified, usually negative, attitude directed towards others because of their social category or group 
membership (Sampson 1999, p.4). 
… the human individual’s psychological tendency to make unfavorable evaluations about members of other 
social groups (Ibanez et al 2009, p.81).  
 
 
The point of the present paper is not to devalue research on prejudice or to deny its profound historical 
significance.  Rather, we wish to explore the limits of the orthodox conception of prejudice as negative 
evaluation. What has this conception contributed to knowledge about relations between groups and what has 
it obscured?  How effective or ineffective has it been in guiding attempts to improve such relations?  The 
paper has two sections. The first section presents some critical alternatives to, or substantive elaborations of, 
the traditional concept of prejudice.  We capitalise in particular on developments in research on paternalistic 
ideology, ambivalent sexism, infra-humanization, common identification, and intergroup helping.  The 
second section interrogates the related process of prejudice reduction, focusing on emerging research on the 
paradoxical consequences of intergroup contact.  We argue that it is especially in the arena of social change 
that the traditional concept of prejudice falls short, and developing this theme, we discuss the tensions 
between prejudice reduction and collective action models of change.  The paper’s conclusion outlines 
directions for future research and recommends some ways in which researchers might move ‘beyond 
prejudice’. 
 
 
 CQ   CQS  
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Limits of a concept of prejudice as negative evaluation 
The ‘velvet glove’ of benign discrimination 
Sherif’s Summer Camp studies are amongst the most influential studies ever conducted on prejudice (Sherif 
et al. 1961). They are rightly heralded as classics in the psychological and sociological literature.  By creating 
an experimental context in which groups of boys competed for scarce resources, Sherif and his collaborators 
famously manufactured forms of intergroup hostility that echoed all too starkly the violence of intergroup 
conflict in the real world.  They demonstrated that ordinary children -- with no prior history of animosity or 
special inclination towards bigotry – could rapidly develop many of the hallmarks of extreme prejudice if 
placed under the right structural conditions, including negative stereotyping, voluntary segregation, and 
verbal and physical aggression. 
In a fascinating thought experiment, however, Mary Jackman (1994) asks us to consider how events might 
have unfolded in these studies had the following conditions prevailed: (1) relations were protracted in time; 
(2) one group of boys achieved stable dominance over the other in terms of the commandeering of valued 
resources; and (3) that this dominance depended on their securing an ongoing transfer of benefits from the 
subordinate group.  Such conditions, of course, mirror real relations of class, race and gender more faithfully 
than the brief, equal status, zero sum competition engineered by Sherif.  Jackman argues that they also yield a 
very different pattern of intergroup responses than that evidenced by the Summer Camp studies.   
The point of her thought experiment is not to discredit Sherif’s contribution.  Instead, Jackman wants to 
highlight the contextual specificity of the Summer Camp findings and to challenge the assumption that 
negative reactions typify everyday relations in historically unequal societies.  To the contrary, she argues, 
real relations of domination and subordination are marked by emotional complexity and ambivalence, with 
positive responses such as affection and admiration mingling with negative responses such as contempt and 
resentment.  Sherif’s work constitutes the exception rather than the rule. According to Jackman (1994, 2005), 
it also captures a wider tendency for researchers to over-emphasize the role of antipathy within 
discriminatory relations between groups. 
Jackman’s (1994) landmark book, The Velvet Glove, addresses this problem, exposing the insidious role of 
positive intergroup emotions in the reproduction of systems of inequality.  Under conditions of long term, 
stable inequality, she contends, it is neither functional nor feasible for members of dominant groups to 
maintain uniformly negative attitudes towards subordinates.  Given that dominants are dependent on 
subordinates’ cooperation in order to sustain a smooth transfer of benefits (e.g. in the form of labour and 
services), the ideal social system is one of paternalism.  Within paternalistic systems, role differentiation 
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allows dominants to define the ideal characteristics of subordinates in ways that sustain the status quo and 
then to reward those who display these characteristics with affirmation, admiration, and even love.  Such 
systems sugarcoat the harsh realities of inequality by framing social relations in more palatable terms for 
both dominant and subordinate group members.  For dominants, exploitation is transformed into paternalistic 
regard.  For subordinates, exploitation becomes more difficult to recognize and to resist.  The bonds of 
connection fostered by paternalistic institutions encourage them identify with the very roles on which their 
subordination is founded. They nurture positive feelings for the dominant group and decrease the motivation 
to challenge the status quo, a point elaborated later in the paper. 
Gender relations provide the clearest illustration of paternalistic influences on intergroup attitudes, exposing 
the limits of a concept of prejudice based solely around negative evaluation.  Such relations were largely 
ignored in early work in the field, when the foundations of prejudice research were laid.  Yet few 
commentators would nowadays dispute that gender discrimination remains pervasive or that men are often its 
complicit beneficiaries.  At the same time, evidence suggests that many men express warm emotional 
attitudes towards women.  Indeed, they tend to like them more than they like other men, a phenomenon that 
is sometimes labeled, not a little ironically, the ‘women are wonderful effect’ (Eagly & Mladinic 1989, 
1993).  If men behave in ways that maintain gender inequality and discriminate against women, then it is not 
because they feel some sort of generic hostility towards them. The traditional concept of prejudice as 
‘unalloyed antipathy’ (Glick & Fiske 2001, p.109) does not seem to fit well. 
 
Ambivalent sexism (and racism) 
This paradox has been investigated recently by researchers working within the theoretical framework of 
Ambivalent Sexism developed by Peter Glick and Susan Fiske. According to Glick & Fiske (2001), sexist 
attitudes come in two forms.  Hostile Sexism (HS) refers to attitudes of overt “hostility towards women who 
challenge male power” (Glick et al. 2004, p.715), and this concept is broadly consistent with an approach that 
treats prejudice as negative evaluation.  Benevolent Sexism (BS), by contrast, refers to attitudes that seem 
supportive towards women, treating them as “wonderful fragile creatures who ought to be protected and 
provided for by men” (Glick et al. 2004, p.715), but also as creatures who lack agency and independence. HS 
and BS are manifest in all cultures and, according to Glick, Fiske and others, their ubiquity expresses a 
fundamental ambivalence in attitudes towards women.  On the one hand, as a subordinate group, women 
must be kept in their ‘proper place’.  This encourages the derogation of those who threaten (the legitimacy 
of) male advantage.  On the other hand, men are dependent on women for, among other benefits, the 
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provision of emotional support, childcare and sexual gratification.  This encourages the veneration of women 
who ‘know their place’, whose conformity to traditional gender roles inspires admiration, idealization, 
sacrifice and protectiveness.  In everyday situations, of course, the expression of these hostile or benevolent 
attitudes is highly flexible, varying, for example, according to whether female targets are perceived as 
undermining (e.g. ‘career woman’) or supporting (e.g. ‘homemaker’) the wider gender hierarchy (see also 
Eagly 2004).   
Ambivalent sexism theory is relevant to our argument here because it directly challenges the assumption that 
intergroup prejudice – and associated forms of discrimination – operates primarily via attitudinal negativity.  
The point of the theory is not simply to explain how men express and reconcile their polarized attitudes 
towards women, but also to highlight the broader ideological role of HS and BS in maintaining gender 
inequality. A number of issues are worth flagging here.  First, BS is associated with a range of discriminatory 
beliefs, attributions and behaviours (e.g. see Abrams, Viki & Masser 2003; Chapleau, Oswald & Russell 
2007; Rye & Meaney 2010). Yet because of its veneer of affectionate regard for (certain types of) women, it 
is less readily perceived as sexist than HS (Barreto & Ellemers 2005).  It is thus a defensible ideology in 
societies where gender equality is a social ideal.  Second and related, as well as shaping men’s gender 
attitudes, BS plays a powerful role in structuring women’s attitudes towards other women.  Longitudinal 
research indicates, for instance, that women who score high on BS are more likely to express hostile attitudes 
towards their own gender in the future (Sibley, Overall & Duckitt 2007).  They are also more likely to judge 
women who transgress traditional gender roles harshly and to support female behaviour that affirms these 
roles, such as the use of beauty products (e.g. Forbes, Jung & Hass 2006). Third, it is important to appreciate 
how hostile and benevolent attitudes act in tandem to sustain the status quo. Cross-national research suggests 
that individuals’ scores on measures of BS and HS tend to be positively correlated and that national averages 
for both forms of sexism are elevated in societies with higher levels of gender inequality (Glick & Fiske 
2001).  
As this brief review illustrates, emerging research on Ambivalent Sexism has gone some way to answering 
Jackman’s (2005, p.89) call for researchers to ‘dethrone hostility’ as the affective hallmark of discriminatory 
relations.  To what extent, however, can work on attitudes in the field of gender relations be generalized to 
other kinds of intergroup relations? 
Doubtless, gender relations are in several senses a ‘special case’, involving unusually intense forms of 
intimacy and interdependency (see also Glick & Fiske 1996).  Even so, there is growing evidence that other 
kinds of intergroup relations may be characterized by a similar blend of positive and negative elements.  
Recent research on stereotype content demonstrates, for instance, that groups other than women (e.g. the 
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elderly) evoke paternalistic prejudices, which combine positive attributions of emotional warmth with 
negative attributions of intellectual incompetence.  Conversely, other groups (e.g. Jews) evoke so-called 
‘envious’ prejudices, which combine attributions of intellectual competence with attributions of emotional 
coldness (see Cuddy, Fiske & Glick 2008).  
Along similar lines, Jackman (1994, 2005) holds that systems of domination other than patriarchy rely on a 
combination of negative and paternalistic attitudes, a claim supported by an array of historical evidence. 
Consider, for instance, the history of slavery in the US.  In their monumental study of the mind of Southern 
US slaveholders, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene Genovese (2005) point out that slaves were widely 
viewed as a sacred trust to whom the owners owed paternal care. As an illustration, they cite one such owner, 
John Hartwell Cocke, who insisted that dutiful slaves should be treated with "kindness, and even sometimes 
with indulgence" (p. 370) and condemned the whipping of a slave out of passion or malice as "absolutely 
mean and unmanly" (p. 370). In stark contrast, however, harsh measures to deal with undutiful slaves – those 
who malingered, stole or absconded – were deemed not only permissible but also necessary by the 
slaveholding community. As William Elliot told members of the State Agricultural Society of South Carolina 
in 1849: "against insubordination alone, we are severe" (p. 368, emphasis in the original).  
This ambivalent alliance between paternalistic care and punitive aggression mirrors Glick and Fiske's 
distinction between benevolent forms of sexism (expressed towards women who accept their dependency) 
and hostile forms (expressed towards those who challenge it).  What Fox-Genovese & Genovese's (2005) 
analysis also confirms is that benevolence towards slaves was not associated with opposition to slavery.  
Quite the opposite.  By subscribing to a code of chivalry, owners sought to depict slavery as "a system of 
organic social relations that, unlike the market relations of the free-labor system, created a bond of interest 
that encouraged Christian behaviour" (p. 368).  After all, only if one was nice to one’s chattel could one 
sustain the legitimizing myth that slavery was "a blessing to both master and slave" (p. 515). 
Although slavery has long been abolished, Jackman (1994) suggests that there remains a complex set of 
interrelations between benevolence, hostility and racial inequality in our own times. Using national survey 
data on race attitudes in the United States, for instance, she has shown that that many white Americans (39%) 
who express inclusive feelings towards African Americans also express conservative or reactionary attitudes 
towards policies designed to create racial equality in the domains of housing, employment and education.  
Positive intergroup emotions, in other words, happily co-exist with rejection of race-targeted interventions, as 
depicted by the ‘paternalistic’ quadrant of Figure 1 below.  Of course, interpreting the implications of such 
findings is not straightforward and resistance to interventions such as affirmative action in the workplace 
does not necessarily equate to racial discrimination.  Moreover, Jackman’s findings do not refute the claim 
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that negative evaluations play a key role in maintaining ethnic and racial inequality in many contexts.  
Indeed, her analysis also shows that only a small percentage of white respondents (7%) who feel emotionally 
estranged from black people support race-targeted policies (the ‘tolerant’ quadrant in Figure 1), whereas a 
high percentage (39%) espouse either conservative or reactionary policy attitudes (the ‘conflictive’ quadrant 
in Figure 1).  Nevertheless, her findings do indicate that antipathy is not the whole story of racial and ethnic 
discrimination, a theme that is being developed in other areas of research. 
 
Figure 1: Configurations of interracial feelings and attitudes towards race targeted policies 
Note: Based on Jackman (1994, p.280). Respondents were classified as having Inclusive Feelings when their 
attitudes towards the outgroup were similar to, or more positive than, their attitudes towards the ingroup. 
Estranged Feelings were defined as feelings where the ingroup was favoured over the outgroup.  Policy 
attitudes were classified as Affirmative, when respondents’ ratings suggested they believed the government 
should be doing more to promote racial equality in the areas of housing, employment and education than they 
were currently doing. They were classified as Conservative or Reactionary when respondents’ ratings 
indicated that the government was already doing enough or too much respectively to promote racial equality. 
 
The spectrum of dehumanization: From genocidal hatred to loving condescension 
As the term suggests, dehumanization is a process through which other people become perceived as ‘less 
than human’.  This process has been associated historically with some of most degrading expressions of 
prejudice.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more negative reaction than one that likens others to animals, 
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filth or disease, relegates them beyond the scope of justice (Opotow 1990), or targets them for mass 
extermination (Staub 1992).  Such brutal expressions of prejudice concerned researchers in the period 
following the Second World War and continue to blight relations in many societies.  They are undoubtedly 
linked to powerful negative emotions such as hatred and disgust (e.g. Goff, Eberhardt, Williams & Jackson 
2008; Harris & Fiske 2006).  As the most recent wave of research illustrates, however, dehumanization also 
assumes subtler forms that are irreducible to affective and cognitive negativity (see Haslam 2006; Leyens et 
al. 2007 for overviews).  In some circumstances, it expresses the kind of ‘benign’ condescension of which 
Jackman (1994, 2005) and Glick and Fiske (2001) have written.  
Advances in this aspect of our understanding of dehumanization have been inspired by the work of Leyens 
and his colleagues, who identified a subtype of dehumanization now widely known as infra-humanisation.  In 
their seminal work, this research group demonstrated that individuals attribute ‘secondary emotions’ (e.g. 
empathy, remorse) more readily to members of the ingroup than to members of the outgroup, but that no such 
difference occurs for the attribution of primary emotions (e.g. anger, happiness) (Leyens et al. 2001; Leyens 
et al. 2003).  Subsequent research has suggested that this process may occur both within our controlled and 
conscious judgments of others (Explicit Infra-humanization) and also within our uncontrolled and 
unconscious associations (Implicit Infra-humanization). Using sequential priming techniques, for instance, 
Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin and Leyens (2007) found that respondents react more quickly to 
ingroup/secondary emotion associations than to outgroup/secondary emotion associations, supporting the 
claim that infra-humanization has an automatic component. 
Many commentators have interpreted infra-humanization as a form of prejudice. After all, primary emotions 
are generally perceived as being shared by human beings and animals, whereas secondary emotions implicate 
moral, civil and aesthetic qualities that are somehow ‘uniquely human’ (Leyens et al. 2001).  To deny that 
outgroup members experience such emotions to the same degree as ingroup members is thus to diminish their 
humanity.  Infra-humanization and other forms of dehumanisation often occur, however, in the absence of 
overt conflict between the groups involved (Leyens et al. 2007).  Moreover, their expression is relatively 
independent of the negative evaluations highlighted by the traditional concept of prejudice: it is the nature of 
the emotional attributions (secondary versus primary) rather than their valence (negative versus positive) that 
is crucial to processes of infra-humanization. 
Indeed, as Haslam and Loughnan (in press) have argued, even forms of dehumanisation that are grounded in 
direct comparisons between people and animals do not necessarily entail antipathy. Saminaden, Loughnan 
and Haslam (2010) found that members of so-called ‘primitive’ or ‘traditional’ cultures were implicitly 
associated with animals but that this association was not accompanied by negative evaluations.  To the 
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contrary, primitives were actually evaluated somewhat more positively than the members of the ingroup.  
Haslam and Loughnan (in press) have suggested that such responses are congruent with idealised and 
superficially positive images of ‘the noble savage’ – images in which members of ‘traditional’ cultures are 
treated as authentic and innocent and thus in need of protection and ‘development’.  In other words, they 
illustrate how dehumanization may sustain relations of benevolent paternalism as much as relations of 
genocidal hatred, a contradiction that would surprise few historians of Western colonialism (e.g. Said 1993).  
 
Ironies of intergroup helping 
Unlike dehumanization, helping is generally conceived as a pro-social phenomenon, involving elevated 
emotions such as empathy, compassion and consideration.  Given that people are generally more inclined to 
assist ingroup than outgroup members (e.g. Levine & Crowther 2008), helping across intergroup boundaries 
has been deemed an especially positive activity. As such, intergroup helping is sometimes used as a yardstick 
for judging the success of prejudice reduction interventions such as common identification.  To cite one 
example: Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, and Ward (2001) reported that White spectators at an American 
football game were significantly more helpful to a Black confederate when he shared their university 
affiliation (indicated via clothing displays) than when he had a different university affiliation. 
However, helping relations also involve an inherent inequality. The act of giving signifies the power of a 
donor to confer benefits to a (needy) beneficiary and may thus produce status differences between them.  
Moreover, at least delivered in certain forms, helping may foster long term relations of dependency and 
inequality.  To use Nalder, Halabi and Harpaz-Gorodeisky’s (2007, p.4) terminology:  “…the continuous 
downward flow of assistance can be conceptualized as a social barter where the higher status group provides 
caring and assistance to the lower status group, which reciprocates by accepting the social hierarchy and its 
place in it as legitimate.” 
Gender relations again provide the most obvious illustration of the political complexity of helping 
relationships. The ability to cater to women’s needs (e.g. economic welfare) has served historically as an 
ideological cornerstone of patriarchal relations and, in so ‘benefitting’, women have sacrificed power and 
autonomy. Over the past decade or so, however, Arie Nadler and his colleagues have identified analogous 
processes operating within other kinds of unequal intergroup relations (e.g. between Israeli Arabs and Jews) 
and have developed a general theoretical model of helping as a ‘status organizing process’ (e.g. see Nadler 
2002; Nadler & Halabi 2006; Halabi, Dovidio & Nadler 2008).  Their work has shown that intergroup 
helping relations may service relations of domination in varying ways depending on the prevailing 
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ideological conditions.  In societies with secure and stable status hierarchies, helping relations often serve to 
justify the status quo. When an advantaged group caters to the needs of a disadvantaged group, and this 
assistance is treated as desirable and necessary, then power relations become ideologically reconstructed as 
moral responsibility.  In societies marked by insecure and unstable status hierarchies, by contrast, helping 
may be a mechanism for reestablishing threatened power differentials.  Revealingly, under such conditions, 
research suggests dominants tend to favour the provision of chronic, dependency-oriented help, which allows 
them to reassert control and shore up the status hierarchy.  By contrast, subordinates tend to favour the kind 
of help that allows them to retain collective autonomy and efficacy. They have misgivings about help that 
entrenches the status hierarchy by enabling others to intervene in their affairs or break down self-reliance 
(see Nadler 2010).  
Helping relations, in sum, illustrate our broader point that superficially positive behavior can have 
discriminatory consequences, being implicated in wider power struggles in historically unequal societies.  
One is reminded here of the words of Albert Camus, who once wrote that “The welfare of the people has 
always been the alibi of tyrants, and it provides the further advantage of giving the servants of tyranny a good 
conscience.” 
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Figure 2  The relationship between the social identity displayed by a black confederate and support for 
assimilationist versus multicultural race-targeted policies (based on Dovidio et al. 2010) 
 
Common Identification: The darker side of ‘we’ 
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A similar kind of argument can be applied to processes of common identification.  Proposed originally by 
Samuel Gaertner and Jack Dovidio, the so-called Common Identity Model holds that inducing members of 
different social groups (e.g. blacks and whites) to view one another as members of a shared ingroup (e.g. 
Americans) tends to improve their intergroup attitudes, reducing intergroup bias and increasing positive 
responses such as liking and empathy (see Gaertner & Dovidio 2000, 2009).  Research on this model is now 
extensive and overwhelmingly supportive.  Common identification is widely viewed as one of the most 
promising interventions to improve intergroup relations.  
In an elaboration of their own model, however, Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy (2009) have discussed the so-
called ‘the darker side of we’, exploring some of the unacknowledged consequences of social inclusion. First, 
they concede that the ideological terms of inclusion are often a site of intergroup struggle.  Members of 
historically advantaged groups typically favour assimilative forms of inclusion (a ‘one-group’ representation 
of common identity) that leave intact the existing status hierarchy, whereas members of disadvantaged 
groups prefer a dual identity model, which tends to better protect their group interests (see also Dovidio, 
Gaertner & Saguy 2008).  Second, although it reduces prejudice by encouraging us to like one another more, 
common identification does not necessarily lead to support for policies designed to produce structural change 
in historically unequal societies. In a striking demonstration, Dovidio and colleagues exposed white students 
to a black ‘confederate’ who displayed either a common category membership (University identity), a dual 
identity (black and a university identity), a black identity, or an individual identity (Dovidio, Gaertner, 
Shnabel, Saguy, & Johnson 2010).  In line with the Common Identity Model, they found that levels of racial 
prejudice – both towards the confederate in particular and black people in general -- were lowest amongst 
whites in the common category condition and levels of ‘empathic concern’ were highest.  However, they also 
found that this group showed least support for policies designed to encourage multiculturalism on campus 
and most support for assimilationist policies that effectively disregard ‘race’ (see Figure 2 above).  To the 
extent that multicultural policies challenge the status quo more than assimilationist policies (e.g. by 
conferring selective benefits to black students) – and we concede that this is a controversial issue in its own 
right -- then one could argue that perceived common identification had the ironic effect of increasing whites’ 
resistance to meaningful social change. 
Emerging research has also examined effects of common identification on the political attitudes of minority 
groups.  Greenaway, Quinn and Louis’s (2011) study of the consequences of appeals to ‘common humanity’ 
provides a revealing illustration.  Although this kind of appeal may unite the victims and perpetrators of 
historical atrocities, increasing ‘forgiveness’ of perpetrators, Greenaway et al argue that it may also reduce 
victims’ intentions to engage in collective action to transform enduring inequalities. Recognizing their shared 
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humanity with others, in other words, may encourage victims to accept discrimination rather than to do 
something about it.  We develop this theme in the next section of our paper. 
 
Summary and Implications 
In sum, several independent strands of research have recently converged to challenge the traditional concept 
of prejudice as negative evaluation. Research on dehumanization has demonstrated how social perceptions 
that sustain intergroup hierarchies may operate in ways that are orthogonal to emotional valence.  
Dehumanization often occurs in absence of rancor.  Indeed, we may deprive others of full human status 
whilst retaining indifference or even a mild, if condescending, affection towards them - as long, that, is, as 
they accept their dependent place.  If subordinate group members begin to contest their dependency, then that 
is often when negativity kicks in. 
Research on common identification suggests that even when we are successful in creating more positive 
intergroup attitudes, encouraging people to evaluate one another more favourably, we may leave unaltered 
the conservative policy orientations of the historically advantaged.  Viewing others as part of a shared 
ingroup, it seems, does not necessarily promote support change in a structural or institutional sense.  
Moreover, members of dominant groups lean towards ‘assimilative’ forms of inclusion that preserve rather 
than challenge social inequalities.   
Perhaps most worrying, research on paternalistic social relations has suggested that ‘benevolent’ intergroup 
attitudes may not only coexist with social inequality, but also serve as a mechanism through which it is 
reproduced.  Men generally express warm and protective, if not loving, attitudes towards women, and reserve 
antipathy primarily for those who challenge the gender hierarchy.  As work on ambivalent sexism (and also 
on racism) has evinced, however, patriarchal relations are sustained by the warmth as well as the antipathy.  
It is the former as much as the latter, for example, that encourages many women to ‘buy into’ conventional 
forms of gender differentiation and indeed to take responsibility for policing their boundaries.  In a similar 
way, attempts by dominant groups to ‘help’ the disadvantaged – arguably the ultimate expression of pro-
social sentiment – may carry consequences that entrench rather than challenge social inequalities.  Although 
such interventions may be motivated by positive emotions (e.g. empathy for others) and carry other 
beneficial consequences, they may equally help to reproduce status differences between the advantaged and 
the disadvantaged.  Helping is thus a double-edged sword. 
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Table 2: Two models of change in historically unequal societies 
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The limits of a prejudice reduction model of social change 
 
Two routes to social change in historically unequal societies 
If negative evaluation of the disadvantaged is defined as the problem, then the emotional and cognitive 
rehabilitation of the advantaged becomes the solution. We need, by this logic, to get such people to like 
others more and to abandon their negative stereotypes.  In due course, incidences of discrimination will 
decline, creating a more equitable society in which the potential for intergroup conflict wanes.  The concept 
of prejudice, in short, implies a ready-made antidote, which is a model of social change grounded in the 
psychology of prejudice reduction (see Table 2 above, top panel). 
The main level of analysis at which this model operates is the individual, the person whose negative feelings 
and thoughts need to be changed.  Of course, if change remained hidden in the recesses of the individual 
mind, then prejudice reduction interventions would have limited utility.  Accordingly, most prejudice 
researchers presume that what happens inside our heads ultimately carries consequences at other levels of 
social reality.  By changing individuals’ prejudices, we also change how they relate to other people in their 
lives, and in turn this effect is believed to ripple outwards to shape wider patterns of intergroup conflict and 
discrimination.  To be sure, the intermediate steps and processes through which this occurs are often 
underspecified.  Nevertheless, we concur with Wright and Baray (in press), who claim that most researchers 
presume that prejudice reduction interventions have positive consequences that flow from a micro 
(individual) to a meso (interpersonal encounters and relationships) to a macro (institutional and intergroup 
relationships) level of analysis in order to create a more peaceful and just society.  
Over the course of its history, this model of change has been periodically challenged. Some critics have 
argued that it individualises the historical, structural and political roots of intergroup discrimination (e.g. 
Blumer 1958; Henriques et al. 1984; Rose 1956; Wetherell & Potter 1992). Others have worried about the 
implication, embedded in several conceptualizations of prejudice, that social change is inevitably 
circumscribed by certain universal and intractable features of human psychology (e.g. Hopkins, Reicher & 
Levine 1994).  Still others have questioned the strength of its supporting evidence (e.g. Paluck & Green 
2009) or directly challenged its underlying assumptions (Reicher 2007).  Nevertheless, prejudice reduction 
remains the most intensively researched and passionately advocated perspective on how to improve 
intergroup relations, and it is particularly influential within the discipline of psychology.  
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It is not, however, the only perspective. Table 2 (bottom panel) depicts a second model of social change that 
has engaged psychologists (e.g. Dion 2002; Drury & Reicher, 2009; Klandermans 1997; van Zommeren, 
Postmes & Spears 2008), along with historians (Rude 1981; Thompson 1991; Tilly, Tilly & Tilly, 1975), 
political scientists (Ackerman & Kruegler 1994; Piven & Cloward, 1979; Roberts & Ash 2009; Ulfelder 
2005), and sociologists (Smelser, 1962; Turner & Killian 1987; Tarrow 2011).  According to this model, 
dominant group members rarely (if ever) give away their power and privileges. Rather, these must be wrested 
from them by members of subordinate groups. The analytic focus therefore shifts away from the goodwill of 
dominants towards the resistance of subordinates.  More specifically, this model highlights the role of 
collective action in achieving social justice.  Its guiding assumption is that social change is predicated upon 
mass mobilization, a process that typically brings representatives of historically disadvantaged groups (who 
stand to benefit from change) into conflict with representatives of historically advantaged groups (who stand 
to lose out from change). Its significance is captured by Frances Fox Piven's contention that the "great 
moments of equalizing reform in American political history" (2008, p.21) have come about through the 
exercise of disruptive collective action.  
To illustrate this alternative to a prejudice reduction model of social change, let us consider what are 
arguably the three greatest moments of racial equalization in modern history: the end of Apartheid in South 
Africa, civil rights reforms in the United States, and the abolition of New World slavery.  In the case of 
Apartheid, there is some controversy over whether or not the violent struggles of the ANC's armed wing 
Unkhonto we Sizwe or the non-violent struggles of civic organizations and Trade Unions had a greater role 
in overturning the system (Zunes 1999). Yet there is little disagreement that change was principally down to 
black collective action.  To say this is not to downplay either the role of international solidarity through the 
boycott movement or the role of white radicals and business organisations in securing the transition to 
majority rule. (Particularly in the twilight years of apartheid, for example, corporations such as Consolidated 
Gold Fields played an important part in bringing the State and the ANC together in negotiations and ensuring 
a peaceful end to the old system.)  Nevertheless, as Harvey (2003) relates in his book The Fall of Apartheid: 
"There can be no doubt that the black majority won South Africa's bitterly fought racial war”, even if, 
equally, there can be no doubt that “white surrender was conditional and took place well before military 
considerations alone would have dictated..." (p. 2). 
The achievement of US civil rights followed a similar trajectory.  Of course, white politicians and white 
radicals played an important role. Yet, as Oppenheimer (1994-5) asks, what happened between April 1st 
1963 when Kennedy opposed the introduction of a Civil Rights Act and May 20th when he directed the 
Department of Justice to draft just such an Act (which was signed into law on July 2, 1964 by Lyndon 
Johnson)?  His answer is admirably terse: "In a word - Birmingham" (p. 646). He is referring, of course, to 
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the massive desegregation campaign led by Martin Luther King who arrived in Birmingham Alabama on 
April 2nd, 1963. The resulting legislative changes had profound effects in all areas of American life, not least 
in the political domain.  In 1965, only 193 black people held elected office in the entire USA. By 1985 - 
when Barak Obama began working as a political organizer in Chicago - the figure stood at 6,016 (Sugrue 
2010). And, of course, on November 4th 2008, Obama himself was elected as President. A popular slogan in 
the last days of his election campaign was "Rosa sat so Martin could walk/Martin walked so Obama could 
run/Obama is running so our children can fly" (cited in Sugrue 2010). Or, as Obama himself acknowledged 
in his Selma speech of March 4th 2007: "I'm here because somebody marched" (full text available at 
http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2007/03/obamas_selma_speech_text_as_de.html). 
Lastly, let us consider how slavery was abolished. This is an area of furious controversy (see, for instance, 
the debate in Drescher & Emmer 2010), and the controversy is complicated by the fact that different 
dynamics were at play in the British, French, Spanish and American instances of abolition (Blackburn 2011). 
However, it is significant that the debate concerns the relative contribution of two different forms of 
collective action: on the one hand, the resistance of slaves themselves, and on the other, the agitation of the 
largely white-led abolitionist movement.  In other words, it concerns the contribution of collective struggles 
both between and within the slave and 'master' communities.  What is not in question is: (a) that abolitionist 
movements were critical in rallying popular sentiment against slaveholding interests (Marques 2006, 2010b); 
(b) that the success of such movements was facilitated by crises or divisions in the slaveholding State (see 
Blackburn 2011); and (c) above all, that slave revolts - or the threat of slave revolts - were critical in inspiring 
abolitionist movements and in ensuring their ultimate success (Marques 2010a). 
In all three examples, then, equality was won rather than given away.  In all three, change was the result of 
sustained collective resistance rather than some kind of general improvement, whether incremental or 
dramatic, in intergroup attitudes.  What is more, the examples illustrate that such collective resistance can 
occur at many levels. The struggle of the subordinate group against the dominant group - and hence the 
struggle to mobilise subordinate group members - often has a determining weight.  However, the struggle 
within the dominant group should not be forgotten, a point to which we shall return in the final section of our 
paper. For the rest of this section, though, we address the question of how the two traditions of research on 
social change depicted in Table 2 are interrelated.  
Although these models have developed largely in isolation, in our experience most researchers presume that 
they are complementary to the broader project of improving relations between groups.  Prejudice researchers 
concentrate on changing the hearts and minds of the advantaged; collective action researchers study how, 
when and why the disadvantaged take political action to create more just societies.  The models seem to fit 
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together as different parts of the overall puzzle of social change. Recent research indicates, however, that 
their interrelationship may be more complicated and more vexed.   
According to Steve Wright and colleagues, the two models of social change entail psychological processes 
that actually work in opposing directions (Wright 2001; Wright & Lubensky 2009; Wright & Baray in press).  
On the one hand, prejudice reduction diminishes our tendency to view the world in ‘us’ versus ‘them’ terms, 
encouraging us to view others either as individuals (e.g. Brewer & Miller, 1984), as part of a common 
ingroup (e.g. Gaertner & Dovidio 2009), or at least as people who share ‘crossed’ category memberships 
(e.g. Crisp & Hewstone 1999).  Such interventions foster positive emotional responses towards others, such 
as empathy and trust, whilst decreasing negative responses such as anxiety and anger (e.g. Esses & Dovidio 
2002; Stephan & Finlay 1999; Pettigrew & Tropp 2008; Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns & Voci 2004).  For the 
most part, they also encourage participants to view one another as equal in status and sometimes involve 
active attempts to establish such equality, at least within the immediate context of intervention (e.g. see 
Riordan 1978).  The overarching objective of this model of social change is to reduce intergroup conflict in 
historically divided societies, producing more stable and peaceful societies.   
On the other hand, collective action interventions are based on the assumption that group identification is a 
powerful motor of social change.  Within this model of change, an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality is generally 
construed as functional and strategic: it encourages members of disadvantaged groups to display ingroup 
loyalty and commitment to the cause of changing society, to form coalitions with similar groups, and, 
crucially, to act together in their common interest (Klandermans 1997, 2002; Tajfel & Turner 1986; Wright 
& Baray, in press; Craig & Richeson, forthcoming).  Collective action also generally requires the emergence 
of ‘negative’ intergroup emotions and perceptions, including anger and a sense of relative deprivation (e.g. 
Barlow, Sibley & Hornsey, in press; Grant & Brown 1995; Van Zommeren, Spears, Fischer & Leach 2004), 
which encourage group members to recognise injustice and status disparities and thus strive to change the 
status quo3.  Its main goal is not to reduce but to instigate intergroup conflict in order to challenge 
institutional inequality.  Conflict is viewed as the fire that fuels social change rather than a threat to 
extinguish at the point of conflagration. 
Paradoxical effects of intergroup contact 
Recognition of the potentially contradictory relationship between these two models of social change has 
inspired research on the ‘ironic’ effects of prejudice reduction on the psychology of the disadvantaged.  This 
idea was originally mooted by Wright (2001), and some of his insights are now being developed by other 
researchers. 
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Emerging research has focused mainly on the impact of interventions to promote intergroup contact, 
extending work on the so-called contact hypothesis (Allport 1954).  The contact hypothesis is the most 
important tradition of research on prejudice reduction, and it has generated a vast research literature that 
spans a wide spectrum of disciplines, including sociology, psychology and political science (e.g. see Allport 
1954; Brown & Hewstone 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006; Forbes 1997; Sigelman & Welsh 1993).  Its basic 
premise is simple.  Interaction between members of different groups reduces intergroup prejudice, 
particularly when it occurs under favourable conditions (e.g. equality of status between participants).  
Evidence supporting this idea is extensive and, many believe, conclusive.  Pettigrew & Tropp’s (2006) 
widely cited meta-analysis found that contact decreased prejudice in 94% of 515 studies reviewed.  A follow 
up analysis (Pettigrew & Tropp 2008) suggested that this effect was largely explained by reductions in 
intergroup anxiety and increases in intergroup empathy, as well as by improvements in participants’ 
knowledge about members of other groups. 
Like most traditions of research on prejudice, research on the contact hypothesis has focused mainly on the 
reactions of members of historically advantaged groups.  In some recent studies, however, the impact of 
contact on the psychology of the historically disadvantaged has been prioritized, with some provocative 
results.   
Dixon, Durrheim and colleagues conducted two national surveys of racial attitudes in South Africa (Dixon, 
Durrheim & Tredoux 2007; Dixon et al. 2010b). Their first survey explored the relationship between 
interracial contact and South Africans’ support for race-targeted policies being implemented by the ANC 
government to redress the legacy of apartheid, including policies of land redistribution and affirmative action 
(Dixon et al. 2007).  They identified a divergence in the results for white and black respondents.  For whites, 
positive contact with blacks was positively correlated with support for government policies of redress; for 
blacks positive contact with whites was negatively correlated with support for such policies.  In other words, 
contact was associated with increases in whites’ and decreases in blacks’ support for social change.  In their 
second survey, Dixon et al. (2010b) investigated the relationship between interracial contact and black South 
African’s perceptions of racial discrimination in the post-apartheid era.  They found that respondents who 
reported having favourable contact experiences with whites also perceived the racial discrimination faced by 
their group to be less severe.  As Figure 3 conveys, this effect was mediated both by perceived personal 
discrimination and by blacks’ racial attitudes.  That is, the inverse relationship between contact and 
judgments of collective discrimination was partly explained by reductions in respondents’ sense of being 
personally targeted for racial discrimination, as well as increases in their positive emotions towards whites.  
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Figure 3 Indirect effects of contact quality on black South Africans’ perceptions of group discrimination 
(taken from Dixon et al. 2010b). 
 
These effects are not unique to the South African situation.  Wright and Lubensky (2009) reported that 
contact with White Americans reduced African and Latino Americans’ willingness to endorse group efforts 
to accomplish racial equality.  Revealingly, as a collective action perspective would predict, this effect was 
mediated by shifts in their sense of identification with their respective ethnic groups.  Similarly, in a 
longitudinal study conducted on a university campus in the United States, Tropp and colleagues found that 
making white friends tended to lower perceptions of racial discrimination and decrease support for ethnic 
activism amongst members of three minority groups (African American, Latino and Asian American) 
(Tropp, Hawi, van Laar & Levin, 2011). The effects were strongest for African Americans, the group who 
otherwise reported the highest levels of experienced discrimination and the greatest willingness to challenge 
such discrimination (e.g. through political demonstrations).  Surveys conducted in Israel by Saguy, Tausch, 
Dovidio and Pratto (2009, study 2) and in India by Tausch, Saguy and Singh (2009) have confirmed these 
‘ironic’ consequences of intergroup contact.  In both studies, positive contact was associated with reduced 
perceptions of social injustice and lowered support for social change amongst members of disadvantaged 
groups (Arab Israelis and Muslims).  In both studies, too, such effects were indirect, being mediated by 
respondents’ attitudes towards the outgroup in question (Jewish Israelis and Hindus). 
Saguy et al. (2009, study 1) and Glasford and Calcagno (2011) have provided laboratory confirmation of 
these survey-based data, laying the foundations for a program of experimental work that warrants further 
development.  Saguy et al. created an experimental paradigm in which higher and lower power groups 
interacted under conditions that emphasized either their differences (less positive contact) or their 
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commonality (more positive contact).  Higher power group members were then asked to distribute a series of 
rewards across the two groups, whilst lower power group members estimated the nature of the resulting 
distribution. The results provided a stark demonstration of the ‘darker side’ of both common identification 
and positive contact -- two pre-eminent techniques of prejudice reduction. Participants in the low 
power/common identity/positive contact cell consistently over-estimated the extent to which higher power 
participants would distribute rewards equitably.  (In reality, the powerful group displayed a predictable 
pattern of ingroup favouritism.)  This study thus highlights the potential problem of nurturing positive 
intergroup evaluations whilst creating false expectations of equality amongst the disadvantaged.  
Glasford and Calcagno (2011) investigated the interrelations between commonality, intergroup contact, and 
political solidarity amongst members of historically disadvantaged groups.  As research on both collective 
action and common identification would predict, their study showed that cueing a sense of common identity 
amongst members of black and Latino communities in the US increased their political solidarity; that is, their 
readiness to work together to improve the status of both groups.  However, this effect was moderated by 
contact with members of the historically advantaged white community.  Specifically, the more intergroup 
contact Latinos had with whites, the less effective the commonality intervention was in fostering their sense 
of political solidarity with blacks.  Once again, notwithstanding its beneficial effects on intergroup attitudes 
and stereotypes, contact exercised a potentially counter-productive impact on the political consciousness of 
the disadvantaged.  As Glasford and Calcagno (2011) elaborated: 
These findings extend and complement recent work that finds that intergroup contact may have 
the unintended consequence of leading disadvantaged group members to attend less to inequality. 
Indeed, whereas intergroup contact with advantaged groups has been shown to lead 
disadvantaged group members to have false expectations for equality, as well as to decrease 
individual group members’ willingness to engage in collective action, the present research 
suggests that intergroup contact can decrease political solidarity, and importantly, it may 
undermine the efficacy of commonalty-based interventions designed to increase political 
solidarity. 
Summary and Implications 
In this section, we have contrasted a prejudice reduction model of social change (based around getting 
dominant group members to like subordinate group members) with a collective action model (based around 
getting subordinate groups members to challenge dominant group advantage). Building on the work of 
Wright and colleagues, we have suggested that these models of change entail different, and potentially 
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contradictory, psychological processes, as illustrated by recent research on the consequences of intergroup 
contact. 
Such research indicates that contact with members of historically advantaged groups may improve the 
intergroup attitudes of the historically disadvantaged, but also, paradoxically, reduce the extent to which they 
acknowledge and challenge wider forms of social injustice or display solidarity with other disadvantaged 
communities.  From a prejudice reduction perspective we have a resounding success: from a collective action 
perspective a dismal failure.  Further, this work shows that the very processes that underpin prejudice 
reduction also help to explain the ‘ironic’ impacts of intergroup contact on political attitudes.  Perhaps most 
significant, several studies suggest that it is precisely because contact improves intergroup attitudes 
(prejudice reduction) that it also decreases perceptions of discrimination, support for race-targeted policies, 
and readiness to engage in collective action.  When the disadvantaged come to like the advantaged, when 
they assume they are trustworthy and good human beings, when their personal experiences suggest that the 
collective discrimination might not be so bad after all, then they become more likely to abandon the project 
of collective action to change inequitable societies.  Jackman’s (1994, 2005) warning reverberates here.  
Inequality is maintained not only through emotional negativity and the exercise of repressive force, but also 
through the ‘coercive embrace’ of an affectionate but conditional sense of inclusion. 
 
Conclusions and future directions 
For most of the history of prejudice research, negativity has been treated as its emotional and cognitive 
signature, a conception that continues to dominate work on the topic4.  By this definition, prejudice occurs 
when we dislike or derogate members of other groups. We do not dispute that research in this tradition has 
focused attention on processes that are essential to understanding the nature of intergroup discrimination. 
Recent work, however, has complicated the idea that prejudice consists exclusively of negative evaluations, 
highlighting the need to develop what Eagly (2004) calls an ‘inclusive’ conception of the role of intergroup 
emotions and beliefs in sustaining discrimination.  A common theme in this research is its functionalist 
emphasis upon the social and psychological processes that serve to reproduce unequal social relations, an 
emphasis that resonates with Rose’s (1956, p.5) early definition of prejudice as a “…set of attitudes which 
causes, supports or justifies discrimination.”  What is clear from evidence on topics such as paternalism, 
ambivalent sexism, common identification, intergroup contact and intergroup helping is that ‘positive’ 
evaluations of others may play as a central role within such processes as negative evaluations. 
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By necessity, our coverage of relevant literature has been selective. We have not had space to review, for 
example, emerging research on the ‘differentiated’ nature of intergroup emotions (e.g. Mackie & Smith 
2002) and stereotype content (Cuddy et al. 2008) or on the broader factors that foster acceptance of unjust 
social systems amongst the historically disadvantaged (Jost, Banajii & Nosek 2004). Nevertheless, taken 
collectively, the research discussed in this paper offers a compelling challenge both to the orthodox 
conception of prejudice as negative evaluation and to the assumption that getting us to like one another more 
is some kind of sine qua non for promoting social change. Although evidence has accumulated steadily for 
several years, it is perhaps only in the domain of gender research that this emerging perspective has had a 
substantial impact, notably through work on ambivalent sexism.  However, the significance of the subtler 
forms of discrimination discussed in this paper extends beyond gender relations.  Paternalistic ideology 
pervades other forms of intergroup relations. It is perhaps in the arena of social change that the limitations of 
the traditional concept of prejudice as negative evaluation become most apparent. 
 
Prejudice reduction and social change revisited: Some suggested parameters and future directions 
The question of change has troubled us most whilst preparing this article. An enduring strength of work on 
prejudice, as noted in our introduction, is that it shifted the target of social science research on intergroup 
relations. The study of immutable and hierarchical differences between groups became recast as the study of 
dominant group bigotry, and in the wake of this paradigmatic ‘reversal’ (Samelson 1978), a rich tradition of 
research on prejudice reduction was born. The latter stages of our paper, however, have complicated this 
optimistic view of the contribution of prejudice reduction interventions.  As it turns out, there is mounting 
evidence that nurturing bonds of affection between the advantaged and the disadvantaged sometimes 
entrenches rather than disrupts wider patterns of discrimination. 
In this closing section, we offer some general reflections on possible routes forward. To begin with, we 
advocate three ways in which research on the consequences of prejudice reduction should be extended, which 
concern the importance of acknowledging: a) the relational nature of intergroup attitudes and perceptions, b) 
the political as well as the emotional and cognitive effects of prejudice reduction, and c) the complex 
relationship between harmony and conflict in the transformation of historically unequal societies.  To 
conclude, we then revisit the question of how, if at all, prejudice reduction and collective action models of 
social change might be reconciled. 
a) Recovering the relational character of intergroup attitudes 
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Research on prejudice has generally focused on the attitudes of the historically advantaged.  This pattern was 
established by formative work on the topic, which sought to redress the problems of racism and anti-
Semitism in the United States.  It shone a harsh spotlight on the bigotry of the white protestant majority. Yet 
it often left the reactions of blacks, Jews and other minority groups in the shadows, implicitly casting them as 
passive targets of bigotry. Of course, this early work had admirable objectives.  As an unintended 
consequence, however, it established a lacuna that has persisted to the present day: a failure to acknowledge, 
sufficiently, how intergroup attitudes emerge in and through the relational dynamics of interaction between 
groups, with the actions of members of one group (e.g. blacks) forming the context in which the reactions of 
the other (e.g. whites) take shape and find expression, and vice versa (see also Shelton 2000; Shelton & 
Richeson 2006).   
This neglect must be borne in mind when evaluating research on the consequences of prejudice reduction 
interventions. Typically, such interventions shape the experiences of members of both historically 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups (e.g. by fostering more frequent intergroup contact).  Moreover, they 
shape not only the intergroup attitudes of each group independently, but also the overall nature of the 
relationship between them (e.g. by encouraging re-categorization so that ‘us’ and ‘them’ become ‘we’). For 
much of the history of research on prejudice reduction, however, scholars have prioritized its effects on the 
responses of the historically advantaged and have left its effects on the psychology of the disadvantaged 
comparatively under specified. 
We recommend, then, that the relational implications of prejudice reduction be brought to the forefront of 
future research. If this is done, then we anticipate that the ironic consequences highlighted in the present 
article will become increasingly apparent.  We also recommend that researchers move beyond a simple, 
dualistic, ‘dominant’ versus ‘subordinate’ group model in order to explore other kinds of relatedness. 
Building on Glasford and Calcagno’s (2011) study, for instance, one might hypothesize that interventions 
designed to improve a subordinate group’s attitudes towards a dominant group (e.g. by creating new forms of 
inclusion) may have unintended effects on its members’ attitudes towards other subordinate groups. Not only 
may such interventions increase horizontal hostility (White & Langer 1999), but also they may decrease the 
willingness of members of different subordinate groups to act collectively in their shared interest. This 
attitudinal pattern is prevalent in post-colonial societies in Africa and the near East, where the ‘divide and 
rule’ strategies of colonial authorities were designed precisely to prevent the formation of rebellious alliances 
that might challenge the status quo. 
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b) Broadening the conception of a successful intervention ‘outcome’ 
Researchers have employed varying indices when evaluating the success of prejudice reduction interventions, 
which have become more sophisticated over time.  Indices of blatant and controlled intergroup attitudes have 
been complemented by indices of indirect and automatic attitudes.  Self-report indices have been 
complemented by behavioral and physiological indices. Scales measuring generic antipathy have been 
complemented by scales measuring specific intergroup emotions and associated action tendencies.  By and 
large, however, the definition of a successful intervention outcome has remained within the boundaries of a 
concept of prejudice as negative evaluation.  As its benchmark, prejudice reduction research continues to 
track shifts in emotional antipathy and pejorative stereotyping (or close proxies). 
This emphasis on the cognitive and emotional rehabilitation of the bigoted individual has led to an under-
utilization of other, equally important, measures of outcome. For one thing, it has downplayed the role of 
positive (or ambivalent) emotions in sustaining relations of discrimination and inequality, a possibility raised 
by the work reviewed in our paper as well as by other functionalist research on how intergroup attitudes and 
beliefs serve to reproduce status and power relations5.  For another thing, it has submerged the political 
dimension of intergroup attitudes and perceptions of social reality.  As Wright and Lubensky (2009, p.18) 
have remarked, “…when efforts to reduce prejudice focus exclusively on getting dominant group members to 
think nicer thoughts and feel positive emotions about the disadvantaged group, they may not necessarily 
increase support for broader structural and institutional changes”.  
Consider, as an instructive example, research on whites’ support for policies designed to promote racial 
equality. Several researchers have argued that such support declines as policies come to threaten the racial 
hierarchy more directly (e.g. see Bobo & Kluegel 1993; Dixon et al. 2007; Schumann, Steeh, Bobo & Krysan 
1997; Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo & Kosterman 1997; Tuch & Hughes 1996).  Along these lines, for example, 
proponents of the Blumerian tradition of sociological research on prejudice have highlighted the evolution of 
what Bobo, Klugel and Smith (1996) have called a ’kinder, gentler, anti-black ideology’ in the US, a set of 
political beliefs that justify racial inequality not in terms of the overt bigotry of ‘Jim Crow’ racism but in 
terms that are more defensible in the modern era.  A key, and seemingly paradoxical, feature of this emerging 
ideology is that widespread acceptance of the principles of equality, integration and anti-discrimination is 
offset by widespread resistance to their concrete implementation. 
According to Jackman and Crane (1986), this kind of attitudinal pattern is unlikely to be eradicated by 
traditional techniques of prejudice reduction, which put ‘parochial negativism’ rather than political attitudes 
at the heart of the problem of social change. In their analysis of national survey data gathered in America, for 
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example, they reported that interracial contact led whites to espouse greater emotional warmth towards 
blacks, but had little impact on their acceptance of government interventions to address racial injustice.  
Likewise, as we have discussed, common identification – another prominent technique of prejudice reduction 
-- may increase dominant group members’ emotional acceptance of minorities without increasing their 
willingness to embrace institutional change (Dovidio et al. 2010). 
Our general point here is not that support for structural change is unaffected by prejudice reduction.  It is that 
prejudice researchers need to adopt a broader conception of the ideal outcomes of intervention.  In particular, 
we need to know more about the relationship between prejudice reduction and the political attitudes that 
sustain the institutional core of disadvantage in historically unequal societies, justifying an unequal 
distribution of wealth, opportunity and political power. How, for example, does prejudice reduction shape 
dominant and subordinate group members’ attributions about the causes of group differences in wealth and 
opportunity?   How does it affect acceptance of ideological belief systems that either justify or challenge the 
status quo (see also Jost et al 2004)?  Over the history of prejudice research, the goal of getting individuals to 
like one another has drawn attention away from these equally, if not more, important outcomes.  
c) Acknowledging the complexities of harmony and conflict  
The promotion of intergroup harmony has always been a cardinal objective of research on prejudice, and 
understandably so. Research on prejudice gathered impetus as a way of explaining the mass violence of the 
Second World War, and subsequent bloodshed throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries did little to allay 
social scientists’ concerns about “the toll in death, suffering and displacement caused by large-scale conflicts 
caused by groups defined by ethnicity, nationality, religion or other social identities…” (Eidelson & Eidelson 
2003, p.183).  In the face of such events, the promotion of harmonious relations became an unquestioned 
moral imperative for many researchers.   
However, the relationship between intergroup harmony, conflict and social change is more complex than it 
first appears.  On the one hand, harmony has a negative face, which our paper has revealed.  To borrow Jost 
et al.’s (2004) terminology, it carries insidious, often unacknowledged, ‘system-justifying’ consequences.  
Seemingly tolerant and inclusive intergroup attitudes not only coexist with gross injustices, but also they can 
serve as a mechanism through which they are reproduced.  On the other hand, if the unquestioned acceptance 
of intergroup harmony as an ‘absolute good’ is simplistic, then so is the unquestioned rejection of intergroup 
conflict as an ‘absolute bad’. Unlike harmony, whose meaning is often taken for granted by social scientists, 
conflict has been intensely scrutinized and condemned as a social problem. By implication, the diffusion of 
intergroup tensions has become the cardinal principle of prejudice reduction interventions.  Whatever other 
 28 
contributions it has made, this approach has entrenched the assumption that conflict between groups is 
inherently pathological, disconnected from human rationality, and without social value. It has quietly 
obscured the possibility that such conflict is also “... a normal and perfectly healthy aspect of the political 
process that is social life.” (Oakes 2001, p.16).  Its psychological correlates of anger, strong social 
identification, recognition of status disparities, and sense of injustice do not sit easily with a prejudice 
reduction model of social change; however, in fuelling collective resistance, conflict may improve intergroup 
relations in a structural and institutional sense.  
The latter point raises several challenging, and perhaps troubling, questions for proponents of a prejudice 
reduction model of social change. What are the dangers of employing interventions that seek, above all else, 
to quell, contain and dissipate intergroup tensions6?  In addition to combating negative stereotypes and 
emotions, should we be seeking to promote ‘positive’ conflict; that is, conflict designed to confront not only 
the direct violence of overt discrimination, but also the indirect violence of structural inequality?  How might 
such interventions fit with the broader project of reducing prejudice?  What form might they take?   
Our argument here is similar to that made by Georg Sorensen (1992) in his discussion of the field of 
international peace studies.  Sorenson criticized researchers’ tendency to extol the core value of ‘peace’ 
whilst leaving its fundamental contradictions unexamined.  More specifically, he railed against a utopian 
perspective in which inconvenient questions are ignored – questions, for example, about the apparent 
ineffectiveness of exclusively non-violent solutions to problems of structural oppression in some societies 
and, conversely, about the apparent effectiveness of short term ‘developmental violence’ in establishing 
longer term peace in others (c.f. Fanon 1965).  We believe a comparable problem afflicts much research on 
prejudice reduction.  Social harmony has become an unquestioned ideal to be promoted, social conflict an 
unquestioned evil to be vanquished.  Breaking with this approach, we advocate greater openness amongst 
prejudice researchers to interrogating the complex relationship between conflict and harmony as it unfolds 
within processes of social change in historically unequal societies. 
 
d) Reconciling prejudice reduction and collective action models of social change? 
The most important question that our paper has left hanging is this: What are the prospects of reconciling a 
prejudice reduction model of social change, designed to help people get along better, with a collective action 
model of change, designed to ignite struggles to achieve social justice?  There are a number of possible 
positions in this debate. One pole of the argument might assert that the two forms of social change are 
fundamentally complementary, i.e. that getting people to like one another more will ultimately lead to social 
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justice in a deeper sense. The other pole might assert that the two forms of social change are fundamentally 
incommensurable and that the drive for prejudice reduction has for too long marginalized, if not obstructed, 
more pressing concerns about core distributive justice (e.g. justice based on the fair distribution of resources 
such as wealth, jobs, and health).  As readers will have gathered, we sympathize with the latter position, 
particularly when applied to the problem of improving intergroup relations in societies characterized by 
longstanding, systemic discrimination7. To conclude, we revisit the question of whether or not the two 
models of social change can be reconciled with the goal of opening up a wider dialogue. 
Thomas Pettigrew and his colleagues have presented the outline of a case for reconciliation, as part of a 
discussion of recent criticisms of research on the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew 2010; Pettigrew, Tropp, 
Wagner & Crisp 2011).  Their case rests on two broad claims. First, they argue that intergroup contact has 
beneficial effects beyond the reduction of negative emotions and beliefs. Not only does it improve relations 
on moral and social indices such as trust and forgiveness, but also it can motivate political activism amongst 
members of historically advantaged groups and this may in turn facilitate change at a structural as well as 
psychological level. For example, Surace and Seeman (1968) studied Americans’ engagement in civil rights 
activities in the 1960s and found that equal status contact was a better predictor of white activism than factors 
such as political liberalism and status concern. We might infer from such evidence that prejudice reduction 
can serve as a psychological mechanism through which members of privileged groups become enlisted 
within oppositional struggles to improve the situation of the disadvantaged, a process about which we still 
know comparatively little (though see Nepstad 2007; Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair & Swim 2008).  Second, 
Pettigrew and colleagues contend that the argument that contact – and by implication other prejudice 
reduction interventions -- inevitably diminishes the collective action orientation of members of historically 
disadvantaged groups is simplistic.  Some research has shown, for instance, that intergroup contact may 
sometimes heighten perceptions of injustice amongst the disadvantaged, encouraging them to make the kinds 
of ‘upwards’ intergroup comparisons that foster a sense of relative deprivation (e.g. Poore et al. 2002). 
Similarly, it is possible to find evidence that common identification increases rather than decreases 
subordinate groups’ concerns over injustice. Wenzel’s (2001) longitudinal study of perceptions of entitlement 
and social injustice amongst East Germans in the post-unification era provides an interesting case in point.  
In light of this sort of evidence, Pettigrew and colleagues have insisted that although contact can sometimes 
reduce a minority’s motivation for protest, this is an 
… incomplete description of the complex relationship between intergroup contact and efforts for 
social change ... As with most social phenomena, the two approaches are intricately entwined. 
Some contact outcomes further mobilization, others counter it. And mobilization itself will in 
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turn influence intergroup contact – increasing it with outgroup allies and decreasing it with 
outgroup opponents (2011, p.278). 
At one level, we see this general line of argument as an important development.  Indeed, it takes us back to a 
point we left hanging earlier in our discussion of slavery and other historical instances of change in unequal 
intergroup relations, where we argued that processes of change involve not only struggles between dominant 
and subordinate groups but also struggles within each group.  Certainly, we accept that it is important to 
examine the processes that lead some dominant group members to oppose the ingroup’s repression of others, 
to pave the way for subordinate group resistance, or even to agitate for an end to dominance themselves.  We 
also accept, as Pettigrew and colleagues argue, that contact and similar interventions may play a role in these 
processes (see also e.g. Dixon et al., 2011, Mallett et al. 2008).  
At another level, however, we believe that it is vital not to diminish the challenge posed by the collective 
action critique of contact research (Dixon et al., 2010a; Wright & Lubensky, 2009), which is addressed at its 
underlying model of social change.  In our view, we cannot simply tack together a prejudice reduction with a 
collective action perspective whilst ignoring their incommensurable assumptions about the mechanisms 
through which change occurs (or is inhibited).  In saying this, we are not dismissing studies that report a 
positive relationship between contact and political activism.  However, we are broadening the terms of the 
debate and prioritizing a set of questions that have not featured prominently either in contact research or in 
prejudice reduction research more generally.  How, when and why do particular kinds of interventions lead to 
collective mobilization to challenge institutional discrimination?  Crucially, what are the underlying 
mechanisms involved?  Do they involve the creation of positive thoughts/feelings about others or alternative 
mechanisms such as, for instance, the recognition of the illegitimacy of dominant group advantages or the 
realization that the oppression of others is a violation of core ingroup norms (e.g. ‘it is unChristian to oppress 
as we do’ - see Brown, 2006)?  Do they involve encouraging subordinate group members to view the 
dominant group in more positive terms or opening their eyes to everyday inequities between groups and 
motivating them do something about them? 
Viewed from this broader perspective, we believe that confidence in the long term efficacy of contact and 
similar prejudice reduction interventions must be qualified in a number of ways. First, as we have seen, when 
power relations are bound up with paternalistic ideologies and associated institutional structures, then the 
promotion of positive evaluations of others is by no means antithetical with conservative political 
orientations. Witness the gulf between men’s feelings towards women and their willingness to support 
militant feminism. Second, the extent to which reducing dominant group member’s prejudice translates into 
effective political action remains open to question. Not only has research revealed a predictably modest 
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relationship between prejudice and discriminatory behavior (e.g. Talaska, Fiske & Chaiken 2008), but also it 
has suggested that reducing prejudice may not result in transformation at an institutional level.  Kalev, 
Dobbin and Kelley’s (2006) recent study of the shifting racial composition of 708 American organizations, 
for example, found that interventions to reduce managers’ racial biases were comparatively ineffective as a 
means of implementing racial diversity. (A more effective strategy was to create institutional structures that 
delineated clear lines of responsibility and accountability for change in the workplace.)   
Third, and most important, historical evidence suggests that social inequality is eradicated more through the 
collective will of the disadvantaged than through the well-intentioned reforms of the advantaged, a point that 
returns us to the key question of how prejudice reduction affects the responses of subordinate group 
members.  Again, we accept Pettigrew et al.’s (2011) claim that it is possible to find studies where intergroup 
contact has increased rather decreased the collective action orientation of subordinate groups members.  In 
the majority of recent research, however, contact has been found to correlate negatively with members’ 
perceptions of discrimination, sense of solidarity with other disadvantaged groups, support for policies 
designed to promote social change, and willingness to engage in collective protest (see Dixon et al. 2007, 
2010; Glasford & Calcagno 2011; Tausch et al. 2009; Saguy et al. 2009; Wright & Lubensky 2009).  
Moreover, although this line of research remains in its infancy, the data produced so far support Wright and 
Lubensky’s (2009) claim that the prejudice reduction and collective action involve opposing psychological 
processes. That is, prejudice reduction decreases the likelihood of collective action precisely because it 
reduces subordinate group members’ sense of collective identity and sense of being targeted for 
discrimination, whilst increasing their positive evaluation of the dominant group.  
Our bottom line, then, is this.  An array of evidence indicates that sociopolitical change often requires the 
disadvantaged to take action.  However, such action is a rare occurrence in many societies. Numerous 
contextual, material and psychological factors militate against its emergence (e.g. see Klandermans 1997, 
2002) and, for this reason, the disadvantaged all too often acquiesce in their own subordination, whether 
existing in a state of serene acceptance or one of resigned tolerance.  As Wright (2001) notes, once 
entrenched, the ‘tranquility’ of inequitable relations between groups is notoriously difficult to disturb.  In so 
far as prejudice reduction undermines the already tenuous possibility that subordinate group members will 
develop the kind of insurgent consciousness that fuels resistance to inequality, it may ultimately reproduce 
rather than disrupt the status quo.  We believe that it is time to reevaluate this model of social change.  We 
need to ask ourselves if prejudice reduction deserves its status as the preeminent framework through which 
we approach the problem of ‘improving’ relations between groups within historically unequal societies. What 
might we see if we did not look at intergroup relations through a lens colored so strongly by the concept of 
prejudice as negative evaluation?  In particular, how might we rethink the problem of change? 
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Notes 
1. As Montagu remarked in his 1949 paper on the “pathognomic mythology” of race, “It is the 
discriminators, not the discriminated, the prejudiced, not those against whom prejudice is exhibited, who 
are the problem” (p.176). 
2. Thus, setting out the concept of prejudice that guided his influential overview of the field, Rupert Brown 
(1995, p.7) remarked that:  
Of course, logically, prejudice can take both positive and negative forms. I, for example, 
am particularly favourably disposed towards all things Italian: I love Italian food, Italian 
cinema, and lose no opportunity to try out my execrable Italian on anyone who will listen 
(much to the embarrassment of my friends and family). However, such harmless 
infatuations hardly constitute a major social problem worthy of our attention as social 
scientists. Rather, the kind of prejudice that besets so many societies in the world today and 
which so urgently requires our understanding is the negative variety: the wary, fearful, 
suspicious, derogatory, hostile or ultimately murderous treatment of one group of people by 
another. 
3. The emotional underpinnings of collective protest movements are, of course, far more complex than this 
brief discussion conveys and involve reactions other than anger and outrage (see Jasper 2011 for a 
detailed discussion).  However, our argument here is simply that such ‘negative’ emotional reactions are 
often crucial in motivating individuals to participate in collective action. 
4. As Quillian (2006, p.300) notes in a recent review, “Despite the changing nature of prejudice in modern 
society, most contemporary social science use of the term is highly consistent with Allport’s (1954) early 
definition of prejudice as “antipathy based on a faulty or inflexible generalization.” 
5. This research includes the work of Eagly (2004) on the relationship between intergroup attitudes, 
structural role differentiation and power relations, and Jost et al. (2004) on the role of intergroup 
emotions and beliefs in systems justification processes. 
6. Maoz (2011) has illustrated one such danger in her recent review of research on the consequences of 
reconciliation encounters between Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis.  The primary model for such 
encounters is the so-called Coexistence Model (which critics have also disparagingly branded the 
‘Hummus and Falafel Model’). Drawing its rationale from work on the contact hypothesis, this model is 
based around the goal of creating dialogue that emphasizes intergroup commonalities and similarities, 
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while downplaying intergroup differences and points of dissension.  Although it has been successful in 
building more positive attitudes, particularly amongst members of the advantaged Israeli Jewish group, it 
has also arguably neglected the political dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  As Maoz warns, such 
reconciliation encounters thus tend to “... perpetuate existing asymmetrical power relations by focusing 
on changing individual-level prejudices while ignoring the need to address collective and institutionalized 
bases of discrimination.” (p.118). 
7. We accept fully that, under conditions of social equality and justice, prejudice reduction remains an 
important ideal in its own right. Our focus in this conclusion, and in the rest of the paper, is on social 
relations defined by long-standing inequality and discrimination. 
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